After each of the above trials, the recruiter in the aspirator was returned to the raid column. The effect of replacing her was dramatic; in one trial where only three
workers had been recruited without the recruiter, 15 workers were recruited within 15 seconds, and by the end of the trial 30 workers had been recruited. Two tests that were unsuccessful without the recruiter were successful when she was replaced (Table 1) .
These experiments show that the recruitment trail contains the essential information necessary for recruitment, but the response is lower than when combined with recruiter activity.
Response of workers to recruiter contact in the absence of a recruitment trail was determined by allowing potential recruiters to drop off a wasp nest to vegetation a few centimeters from a raid column. Ants on the column became visibly excited within seconds, and in a few minutes had ascended vegetation and were randomly searching upward in the vicinity of the wasp nest. The ants searched for almost a half hour, and several workers came within a few centimeters of the nest. Most likely, the ants would have located and attacked the nest except for the intervention of a hard rain. Similar searching has been observed prior to raids on other wasp nests. Thus, even without a recruitment trail, a recruiter releases searching behavior which may lead to prey capture.
Ant recruitment is based primarily on chemical and tactile signals. The expression and information content of those signals vary among ant species and result in diverse recruitment systems. Compared to other recruitment systems, that of army ants is among the most efficient in terms of gathering large numbers of workers quickly. In the relatively primitive system, called "tandem running," constant recruiter contact is necessary for orientation, and only one worker is recruited at a time (14). More advanced recruitment systems rely increasingly on chemical trails for orientation. In the system we term "group recruitment," orientation by the recruiter is still essential, but a chemical trail allows a large group of ants to follow a single leader. If the leader is removed, the group disbands (3) . Group recruitment grades into "mass recruitment" in which the chemical trail is the primary orientator.
Here the greatest efficiency is achieved. Less dependency on a single recruiter for orientation results in more continuous recruitment. The recruiter, however, still retains an important role. For example, in Monomorium venustum contact with the recruiter mobilizes the ants to search for an odor trail put down by the recruiter out- 13 JUNE 1975 side the nest. The ants do not follow the trail unless previously activated by the recruiter (4) . In Solenopsis invicta the recruiter "alerts" workers to a chemical trail by vibratory antennal contact; the trail itself attracts and orients the recruits (5 (7) on habitat choice in Peromyscus subspecies, to give one example, has been aimed precisely at this point. Apart from the foregoing argument, Layzer also suggests that in any case the critical studies on human monozygotic twins reared apart (MZA) have all involved some selective placement such as to generate genotype-environment interactions. This is certainly true in some cases, but, in the particular study he chooses to cite that by Burt (8) the empirical correlation between socioeconomic status of one twin and socioeconomic status of the other twin is no different from zero. Jensen has computed such a correlation (.03), and I have verified it using a slightly different method. The fact that in most cases one member of each pair was reared by his natural parent is quite irrelevant to any conclusion. Consequently, I do not conclude, as Layzer does, that all the MZA data can be dismissed. Much the same applies to the fostering studies.
Layzer appears to favor the kind of design represented by the various intervention programs-for example, the Milwaukee Project (1, p. 1264 ). I would not argue against this. However, apart from the fact that most such projects (including especially the Milwaukee Project) have not produced lasting gains, they are still by no means free of the problems which Layzer sees as being inherent in the twin and fostering studies. They do not involve random allocation of genotypes to treatments, nor do they, to any degree, control for selection by genotypes of microenvironments. Certainly, on humane grounds, these kinds of enterprise must be considered desirable and essential. But it hardly seems likely that they will furnish us with answers of a precision and quality that are scientifically impeccable.
In conclusion, I must emphasize that Layzer's intelligent interest in the heritability of IQ should be welcomed by behavior geneticists. I welcome it myself. But I do consider that his assessment of more than 70 years' work on the problem, carried out by a great number of investigators using a variety of methods, is unduly harsh and overestimates the ambiguities that exist in the data.
WILLIAM R. THOMPSON Department ofPsychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6
It is unfortunate that the phrase "Science or numerology?" in the title of Layzer's article (I) implies such scorn, for his own rigorous and serious attention to heritability is adequate proof that h2 is not to be casually laughed off. The standard analyses used by geneticists and psychologists are obviously not those of a quack science, although there surely are, as Layzer asserts, some hidden assumptions that must be considered. And indeed Arthur Jensen, among others, has already taken careful note of certain of these (2) .
There also appear to be some hidden assumptions implied by Layzer's own analysis. His first words pose the question: "To what extent can the development of basic cognitive skills be influenced by various kinds of environmental intervention?" (2, p. 1259). He then argues that h2 is central to this question, and he proceeds to a mathematical analysis of h2, showing that it is often difficult to tell, from such broad heritability, the amount of narrow heritability. He draws particular attention to two problems in such estimates, one caused by interaction and one by covariance. And he ends with praise for a particular environmental intervention, the socalled Milwaukee Project.
Taken as a whole, Layzer's article implies the following: that his mathematical criticisms of h2 strengthen the environmentalist case against the hereditarian arguments of Jensen, Herrnstein (3), and others. His article, then, implies that any doubt cast upon heritability estimates can somehow bolster the sagging faith in such educational and social interventions. His own analysis, however, seen in statistical and logical terms, carries a strong refutation of any such optimism. It is the aim of this letter to make such paradoxes explicit.
Layzer's first major criticism of h2, when applied to intellectual tests on human populations, is that there may be a substantial amount of "interaction" of genetic and environmental influences concealed in the usual large estimates. In formal terms, this possibility is represented (1, p. 1260) by his equation 5, Var(P) = Var(G) + Var(E) + 2 Cov(G,E) + I where P stands for the measured, or phenotypic, trait, G is the contribution of direct genetic influences, E is the similar contribution of environment, Cov(G,E) is the contribution of the correlation between heredity and environment, and I represents the interaction of heredity and environment. Layzer's valid point is that when estimates of heritability of IQ (or any other measure) are made in the usual way, h2 may be inflated by such covariance and by such interaction.
For simplicity, let us consider these possibilities separately, beginning with the possible influences of interaction, or I in his equation. To understand the paradox presented by such interaction, let us examine the hypothetical data in Fig. 1 Indeed, Layzer has laid a logical trap for himself in the matter of covariance, and his argument exposes a very large inconsistency. Again, for simplicity, the I will now be ignored and the equation simplified.
We usually assume that "good environment" has something to do with socioeconomic status (SES), with cultural influences in the home and school, and with similar measurable signs of well-being. On In Layzer's article, take z as P(x,y), so that G(x) = E (P(x,y)lx) is E (zlx). The covariance between G and Layzer's R when x,y are independent is the covariance between G and P-G, and one may immediately apply the second basic fact above to see that the covariance is zero. There is no need for series expansions or similar heavy machinery.
WILLIAM KRUSKAL Department ofStatistics, University ofChicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637 I will attempt to deal with Thompson's concise and orderly critique paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraph 3: The answer to the question posed here, "whether h2 at y, should be greater or smaller than at y2," is "neither"; h = I in both cases, and the question would be equally trivial for any specified environmental ranges. I do not understand why Thompson regards this question as presenting an "interesting and potentially soluble problem." The point I actually made in this connection was the obvious but important one that the heritability of a trait for a given population and a given set of environmental conditions tells us nothing about the relative importance of genetic and environmental variations under a different set of environmental conditions. Paragraph 4: Toward certain problems-for example, the problem of squaring the circle or the problem of constructing a perpetual motion machine-an "attitude of hopelessness" may be appropriate. effectiveness of intervention programs, it is literally true that most of them have not produced sustained cognitive gains. This generalization, however, emphatically does not apply to a particular class of intervention programs: those that "place major emphasis on involving the parent directly in activities fostering the child's development" (3). As Bronfenbrenner (3) has shown, the successful intervention studies are beginning to define a clear and consistent pattern. They are beginning to teach us why disadvantaged children do not realize their cognitive potentials and how their chances of doing so can be improved. This is science without numerology.
Page's remarks fall under two main heads. (i) He considers my critique of heritability analyses to be internally inconsistent and self-refuting, and asserts that, my arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, valid inferences concerning genetic differences between socioeconomic and racial groups can be drawn from published heritability analyses. (ii) He argues that the outcomes of "remedial programs aimed at lower-SES populations" have failed to produce durable results that stand up to "close scrutiny by critical outsiders." I think Page is mistaken on both counts. Consider first his strictures on "remedial programs." These recall Arthur Jensen's famous dictum, "Compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed" (4). Such judgments are doubly flawed. In the first place, they are, so to speak, ungrammatical. "Education," rightly understood, cannot take a verb in the perfect tense, for it denotes an imperfect process in both senses of the word: education is never completed, and it always admits of improvement. The second flaw in the PageJensen obituary for compensatory education is that it is premature. Although most compensatory and intervention programs have indeed failed to produce durable results, a few have produced substantial and sustained gains in cognitive performance. Urie Bronfenbrenner, in a report to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (3), has pointed out that these successful programs have certain key features in common, features that the unsuccessful programs lack. Although Bronfenbrenner's tentative conclusions need to be confirmed by additional work, they afford rational grounds for believing that appropriate large-scale social and educational programs could wipe out functional illiteracy and innumeracy as effectively as public health programs have wiped out smallpox and diphtheria.
What no intervention study or compensatory program has so far produced is a 13 JUNE 1975 simple and inexpensive remedy for cognitive deficits among the disadvantaged. Bronfenbrenner argues that an effective intervention program must be "ecological" in scope: it must "provide adequate health care, nutrition, housing, employment and opportunity and status for parenthood." Given such intervention, the available evidence indicates that "even children from severely deprived backgrounds of mothers with IQs below 70 or 80 are not doomed to inferiority by unalterable constraints either of heredity or environment." Bronfenbrenner adds, however, that "ecological intervention will require major changes in the institutions of our society."
Page mentions two particular studies: "performance contracting," which he describes as "the most rigorous large-scale experiment in educational history"; and Heber's Milwaukee Project, which he dismisses as having "no clear scientific or practical meaning." The failure of performance contracting, he says, was a "major blow" to "optimism about the potential benefits of remedial programs aimed at lower-SES populations." Its actual impact was considerably milder than this language might suggest. It did, perhaps, dampen the hope that operant conditioning in the classroom could overcome the effects of severe and sustained physical, emotional, and cognitive deprivation. (I say "perhaps" because the rigor of the experimental design did not, unfortunately, extend to its implementation.) But this hope does, after all, reflect a view of cognitive development that modern studies (5) had rendered exceedingly improbable long before performance contracting was sold to the Office of Economic Opportunity.
As to the Milwaukee Project, I have to admit that a careful reading of Page's published critiques (6) and of the lucid, detailed, comprehensive, and copiously documented report by Heber, Garber, Harrington, and Hoffman (7) and environment are uncorrelated. Since this condition is never met by pheno-typically plastic traits in natural human populations, I concluded that meaningful heritability estimates cannot now be obtained for such traits.
Page argues that assuming genotype and environment to be correlated is tantamount to granting the hereditarian thesis that "the higher SES groups are, already, innately smarter than the lower SES groups." To pinpoint the fallacy in this argument, consider a phenotypically plastic trait that is easier to define and measure than intelligence: proficiency in the game of squash. Few people will deny that this proficiency is correlated with genetic factors (for example, genes specifying a predilection for strenuous forms of exercise). It is also undeniable that the general level of proficiency at squash is substantially greater among students and graduates of Ivy League colleges than among students and graduates of the Big Ten. Page and the authors whose views he cites with approval would, I hope, reject a genetic explanation for this systematic difference. Why, then, do they persist in interpreting systematic behavioral differences between social, economic, and racial groups as evidence for systematic genetic differences?
I The conservation of energy, in the case of heat flow in one dimension, is expressed as pCp;T= F+Q (1) where p is the density, Cp is the specific heat, T is the temperature at depth z and time t, F is the vertical heat flow, and Q is any heat source density. Equation 1 is valid for all materials (for example, inhomogeneous plastics) if F is suitably defined (below). The one-dimensional case is sufficient for this problem, as the indicated (/) horizontal temperature gradients are less than the vertical gradients by more than an order of magnitude. The heat flow is given by F(t,z) = ks 4T + Fconv where the conductive term (the first term on the right) depends upon the thermal gradient and ks, the thermal conductivity in the stationary state. The convective contribution Fconv is indicated only symbolically; it is always positive or zero. Hence F(t,z) ) k5s T (2) in both liquids and solids. It has been shown (4) that k, increases slowly in the upper 400 km, being always greater than 3 x 105 centimeter-gram-second units.
One can apply these equations in an elementary way to a temperature distribution showing upward curvature, as in the "petrologic model" (1) ( by heating of the lithosphere) in a maximum of (10 to 20) x 106 years and possibly sooner; that is, if the petrologic model geotherm does represent true paleotemperatures just prior to surface emplacement (some 100 x 106 years ago) of the corresponding ultramafic rocks, that thermal structure has long since smoothed itself out. Conversely, it could not have existed for more than a few million years prior to the emplacement event without conductively heating up the lithosphere and removing the inflection. Hence it must be considered an extraordinary situation, not part of a steady evolutionary development, and not generalizable to other areas in similar tectonic settings (for example, similar distances from spreading centers). In effect, it constitutes petrographic evidence of a transient (or mobile) anomalously hot spot in the mantle rather than a representative geotherm.
The neglected source term Q does not affect this conclusion. The time scale for the conduction of heat into the lithosphere does not depend on the source of the heat, be it convectively transported from below or internally generated by radioactivity or viscous dissipation. Only a negative heat source (a heat sink) at the top of the asthenosphere could maintain a concave-upward geotherm for significant times. The only heat sinks available are endothermic chemical reactions, such as melting or dehydration, and descending diapirs. Considering first the endothermic reactions, the reaction rate required to maintain an inflection in the geotherm is easily calculable. It is more instructive, however, to estimate the steady-state rate of accumulation of reaction products, since this quantity is independent of Az, the interval of upward curvature of T(z). This production rate is easily shown to be p ks
where L is the latent heat of the reaction. 
